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Abstract 
In February 2010, the Tax Court held that a taxpayer’s expenses incurred for 
hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery were deductible as medical expenses 
under § 213 because they treated the disease of gender identity disorder.  The court, 
however, was deeply divided in its determination of whether sex reassignment surgery 
qualifies as nondeductible cosmetic surgery under § 213(d)(9).  In 1990, Congress 
amended § 213 to exclude cosmetic surgery from the definition of deductible medical 
care.  Since then, the Tax Court and the I.R.S. have rarely addressed the meaning and 
extent of that exclusion.  The judges’ divergent opinions in O’Donnabhain make it clear 
that a thorough examination of the statutory meaning of cosmetic surgery is timely. 
This Note considers what should qualify as cosmetic surgery within the context of 
the medical expense deduction.  It argues that a medical procedure that improves 
physical appearance should be deductible under § 213 when it is physician-prescribed 
treatment for a specific disease, and consistent with generally accepted medical practice.  
This analysis is grounded in the statutory language of § 213, and is supported by broader 
principles that bear on the policy debate surrounding the medical expense deduction 
more generally. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Tax Court recently held in O’Donnabhain v. Commissioner 1  that a 
taxpayer’s expenses incurred for hormone therapy and sex reassignment surgery (“SRS”) 
were deductible as medical expenses under § 213 because they treated the disease of 
gender identity disorder (“GID”).  The court, however, was deeply divided in its 
determination of whether SRS qualifies as nondeductible cosmetic surgery under 
§ 213(d)(9).  The judges’ divergent opinions make clear that a thorough examination of 
the statutory meaning of cosmetic surgery is timely. 
Medical expenses are permitted as itemized deductions to the extent that, in the 
aggregate, the amount of such unreimbursed expenses exceeds 7.5% of a taxpayer’s 
adjusted gross income (“AGI”), or 10% of his AGI for the purposes of the alternative 
minimum tax (“AMT”).2  Section 213(d) provides that deductible medical care includes 
amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease.  In 
1990, Congress amended § 213 to exclude cosmetic surgery from the definition of 
medical care.3  Since then, the Tax Court and the I.R.S. have rarely addressed the 
meaning and extent of this exclusion.  This Note considers what qualifies as cosmetic 
surgery within the context of the medical expense deduction.  Part II examines the role of 
the medical expense deduction and surveys the policy debate about the deduction.  Part 
III considers the statutory language of § 213 as well as case law that has interpreted 
§ 213.  Part III closes by proposing a two-part test for the deductibility of medical 
procedures that also improve physical appearance.  Under this test, physician-prescribed 
treatment for disease that is consistent with generally accepted medical practice is not 
cosmetic surgery.  Part IV analyzes the controversy in O’Donnabhain, and concludes that 
SRS that is prescribed to treat GID is not cosmetic surgery.  This interpretation of § 213 
is grounded both in the statutory language and in the policy guidelines established in Part 
II. 
II. THE TAX POLICY DEBATE ABOUT THE MEDICAL EXPENSE 
DEDUCTION 
A. Tax Expenditures 
The academic debate about the medical expense deduction has traditionally been 
over whether the deduction is a tax expenditure.  An ideal income tax has been described 
as one in which all personal income is taxed uniformly and comprehensively.4  The tax 
expenditure concept is generally attributed to Professor Stanley Surrey.5  In his book 
written with Professor Paul McDaniel, Surrey argued that a number of tax code 
provisions are departures from an ideal income tax and instead consist of special 
preferences for certain taxpayers or activities.6  According to Surrey and McDaniel, these 
                                                      
1 134 T.C. 34 (2010) , acq. 2011-47 I.R.B. 2. 
2 I.R.C. §§ 213(a) (West Supp. 2010), I.R.C. 56(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2010). 
3 See infra Part III.B.2. 
4 See William D. Andrews, Personal Deductions in an Ideal Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 
317 (1972). 
5 See STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. MCDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES (1985).  
6Id. at 3 (“The tax expenditure concept posits that an income tax is composed of two distinct 
elements.  The first element consists of structural provisions necessary to implement a normal income tax . . . 
. The second element consists of the special preferences found in every income tax.  These provisions, often 
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“nonneutral” provisions are suspect alternatives to direct grants or other government 
assistance programs. 7   Surrey and McDaniel identified two major flaws of tax 
expenditures.8  First, tax expenditures are inequitable because they are upside-down 
subsidies.9  The tax code’s progressive rate structure means that tax expenditures in the 
form of exclusions or deductions benefit high-income taxpayers more than low-income 
taxpayers and provide no benefit at all to persons with no tax liability.10  Tax expenditure 
deductions are also not progressive because they are itemized deductions and thus not 
available to taxpayers who take the standard deduction.11  Second, tax expenditures are 
inefficient means of achieving their purposes because they often incentivize 
counterproductive distortions of taxpayer behavior.12 
Several government entities promulgate tax expenditure budgets, which 
characterize certain tax code provisions as government expenditures and estimate the lost 
revenue due to these provisions.13  The medical expense deduction, among other personal 
deductions, is included as a tax expenditure in these annual budgets.14  Scholars are 
divided on whether the medical expense deduction is appropriately characterized as a tax 
expenditure.  Tax expenditure analysis urges that tax expenditure deductions are 
inefficient and inequitable.  If the medical expense deduction is an expenditure, it may 
contravene progressivity and be a subsidy to wealthy taxpayers.15  This section will 
examine the long-standing debate on this issue. 
B. Defense of the Medical Expense Deduction 
Defense of the medical expense deduction comes in different forms.  The seminal 
defense is the 1972 article written by Professor Williams Andrews.16  Andrews begins his 
analysis with the classic Haig-Simons definition of income.17  Henry Simons described 
                                                                                                                                                 
called tax incentives or tax subsidies, are departures from the normal tax structure and are designed to favor a 
particular industry, activity, or class of persons.”). 
7 Id.  But cf. David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax and Spending Programs, 
113 YALE L.J. 955, 1026-27 (2004) (arguing that tax expenditures are legitimate and useful substitutes for 
direct government grants). 
8 SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 5, at 79-87.  
9 Id. at 79-82.   
10 Id.  See also Andrews, supra note 4, at 310-11; Jeffrey H. Kahn, Personal Deductions–A Tax 
“Ideal” or Just Another “Deal”?, 2002 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C.L. 1, 4 (2002).   
11 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 5, at 79-82; Thomas D. Griffith, Theories of Personal 
Deductions in the Income Tax, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 343, 352-53 (1989).  But see Griffith, supra at 355-60 
(arguing that there are alternative ways to judge tax progressivity). 
12 See SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 5, at 82-87.   
13 See, e.g., STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, 111TH CONG., ESTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX 
EXPENDITURES FOR FISCAL YEARS 2009-2013 (Joint Comm. Print 2010), available at 
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/joint/hjoint01cp111.html; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, FISCAL YEAR 
2012, ANALYTICAL PERSPECTIVES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT 239-56 (2011), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/Analytical_Perspectives.  
14 STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 13, at 42; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 13, 
at 243.  
15 See generally Kahn, supra note 10, at 3-4 (“Critics of personal deductions contend that the 
deductions do not implement the goals and purposes of a progressive income tax system, but rather are 
employed as a device to subsidize taxpayers for programmatic purposes.  The critics maintain that, as a result, 
these deductions will erode the tax base, reduce progressivity, and contravene the principles of horizontal and 
vertical equity.” (citations omitted)).   
16 Andrews, supra note 4. 
17 Id. at 320-25.  Simons viewed his definition as a refinement of Robert Haig’s.  Haig’s definition 
was "the money value of the net accretion to one's economic power between two points of time.”  ROBERT M. 
HAIG ET AL., THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX 7 (Robert M. Haig ed., 1921) (emphasis in original). 
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personal income as the algebraic sum of the market value of rights exercised in 
consumption and the accumulation of net worth.18  According to Andrews, Simons’ 
description of income is best understood not as a final definition, but rather as an attempt 
to delineate a universe in which to further elaborate on income.19  The most important 
thrust of Simons’ efforts is to highlight the insufficiency of net receipts as the entire 
scope of personal income.20   
Because it is difficult to measure consumption directly, money income is 
commonly accepted as the starting point for the measurement of personal income, with 
adjustments made to properly reflect the taxpayer’s full consumption plus 
accumulation.21  Simons indicated that if a taxpayer’s consumption includes things that 
the taxpayer did not pay for, the market value of that consumption should be included in 
the taxpayer’s income. 22   On the other hand, if the taxpayer’s consumption plus 
accumulation is less than his money income, he should be entitled to a deduction.23  
Typically, this is understood to be the business expense deduction in which the taxpayer 
is allowed to deduct from his income the cost of producing that income.24  However, 
Andrews argues that there are deductible expenses that are not business related but also 
do not reflect the taxpayer’s consumption.25  
According to Andrews, medical expenses are not taxpayer consumption. 26  
Andrews contends that the use of consumption as a tax base is meant to measure 
“material well-being and taxable capacity.”27  When a taxpayer spends money on medical 
care because of his poor health, the expense merely returns the taxpayer to a state of well-
being.28  By incurring the medical expense to treat himself, the taxpayer is put in the 
same position as someone in good health whose earnings equal his own after subtracting 
the cost of the medical expense.29  Implicit in this analysis is the argument that, because 
the disease is not voluntary, the taxpayer is not consuming when he acts to treat the 
disease.30  Another way to express this is that the taxpayer’s ability to pay should be 
evaluated only after his necessary expenses beyond normal living expenses have been 
                                                      
18 HENRY C. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOME TAXATION 50 (1938).  In its short form, this definition is 
described as consumption plus accumulation. 
19 See Andrews, supra note 4, at 324-25. 
20 See id. 
21 See id. at 327-31; William J. Turnier, Personal Deductions and Tax Reform: The High Road and 
the Low Road, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1703, 1706-07 (1986). 
22 Andrews, supra note 4, at 325. 
23 Id. 
24 See id. 
25 See id. at 313-17 (maintaining that expenses deductible under the medical expense and charitable 
contribution deductions are not properly depicted as taxpayer consumption). 
26 Id. at 331-43. 
27 Id. at 335.   
28 Id. at 334-36.  But see Griffith, supra note 11, at 369-75 (contending that Andrews fails to draw a 
sufficient distinction between monetary and nonmonetary well-being and questioning Andrews’ normative 
justifications in general). 
29 Andrews, supra note 4, at 334-36.  For example, A is ill, earns $50,000, and spends $10,000 to 
become healthy, whereas B earns only $40,000 but is in good health and does not have the $10,000 medical 
expense.  But see Louis Kaplow, The Income Tax as Insurance:  The Casualty Loss and Medical Expense 
Deductions and the Exclusion of Medical Insurance Premiums, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1485, 1493-94 (1991) 
(arguing that the taxpayers are not put in the same position by § 213, because A is only compensated to the 
extent that his loss exceeds the nondeductible floor). 
30 See Mark G. Kelman, Personal Deductions Revisited: Why They Fit Poorly in an “Ideal” 
Income Tax and Why They Fit Worse in a Far From Ideal World, 31 STAN. L. REV. 831, 859, 863-64 (1979).   
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deducted from his net receipts.31  Andrews argues that it follows that the medical expense 
deduction is not a tax expenditure and does not conflict with an ideal income tax.32 
Instead, the deduction is a refinement of the concept of income to bring it into line with 
normative tax principles.33 
Andrews’ position is that the medical expense deduction is a way to fine-tune the 
tax base to ensure that only income is being taxed.  In this scheme, medical expenses are 
not consumption, and must be subtracted from net receipts before we can arrive at taxable 
income.  But, one need not reconceptualize consumption in order to accept the medical 
expense deduction as being in line with tax policy.  Related lines of argument contend 
that tax policy goals allow for the deduction within an ideal income tax, but without 
finding this justification in the definitions of income or consumption.  For example, 
Professor Jeffrey Kahn argues that the medical expense deduction is not an expenditure 
because it furthers progressivity.34  Although its precise justification is debated among 
scholars, progressivity enjoys majority support and is a foundational tenet of tax law.35  
Progressivity is defensible on equitable grounds because it provides for an equalization of 
sacrifice among taxpayers.36  We can define consumption in a more conventional sense–
for example, as using money to obtain satisfaction37–and still follow Kahn’s logic.  Kahn 
argues that progressive tax rates are meant to provide for a zero tax rate on subsistence 
income. 38   Because the tax structure is standardized and crude, adjustments are 
sometimes necessary for taxpayers with subsistence expenses far beyond the norm.39  
Routine medical expenses are part of the ordinary living expenses covered by the 
standard tax brackets.40  However, progressivity requires that taxpayers with unusually 
large medical expenses be accommodated through the medical expense deduction.41  A 
taxpayer with such expenses experiences a reduction in his ability to pay.42  Even if we 
concede that the taxpayer’s medical expenses are consumed assets, equitable principles–
themselves a normal part of tax law–require that the taxpayer’s burden be mitigated by a 
                                                      
31 Andrews, supra note 4, at 326-27. 
32 See Andrews, supra note 4, at 331-43. 
33 See id. 
34 See Kahn, supra note 10, at 14 (citations omitted). 
35 See id. at 16. 
36 See Walter J. Blum & Harry Kalven, Jr., The Uneasy Case for Progressive Taxation, 19 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 417, 421 (1952) (suggesting that progressive tax rates balance out regressivity in other tax provisions 
and thus make the total burden of all taxes proportionate to taxpayer income); Kahn, supra note 10, at 21-23 
(proposing that progressive taxation is equitable because the value to a taxpayer of each dollar declines as the 
taxpayer’s income increases).  See also Andrews, supra note 4, at 325-27 (arguing that the purpose of the 
income tax is to levy taxes according to ability to pay). 
37 Kelman, supra note 30, at 834.  See also Turnier, supra note 21, at 1730 (“Medical expenses 
reflect expenditures to finance consumption of goods and services by the taxpayer to attain a personal benefit, 
namely the alleviation of a disease or the repair of an injury.”). 
38 Kahn, supra note 10, at 27-29. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id.  Scholars have suggested that the medical deduction’s statutory floor is meant to ensure that 
only extraordinary expenses will be reimbursed.  See Boris I. Bittker, Income Tax Deductions, Credits, and 
Subsidies for Personal Expenditures, 16 J.L. & ECON 193, 198 (1973) (referring to an earlier version of 
§ 213); Kahn, supra note 10, at 28.   
42 See James E. Jensen, Medical Expenditures and Medical Deduction Plans, 60 J. POL. ECON. 503, 
503 (1952) (“Medical expenditures reduce the ability to pay taxes, and, therefore, a medical deduction from 
the income tax creates a differentiation according to ability to pay.”); Turnier, supra note 21, at 1730-31.  See 
also STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., TAX EXPENDITURES FOR HEALTH CARE 24 (J. Comm. Print 
2008), available at http://jct.gov/publications.html (citing Andrews, supra note 4; Turnier, supra).   
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deduction.43  Thus, according to Kahn, because the deduction is recommended by 
principles within the tax structure, it is not an expenditure.44   
These arguments are not totally disparate.  Although they differ in their 
conclusions about the meaning of income, there are significant generalities that can be 
drawn.  Specifically, defenses of the medical expense deduction rely, implicitly or 
explicitly, on the understanding that taxpayers with medical expenses stemming from 
involuntary disease that are beyond routine expenses merit a reduction in their tax 
burdens because of the financial hardship of the medical expenses.  Proponents of the 
deduction argue that such taxpayers experience a reduction in ability to pay.45  Tax 
expenditure analysis criticizes tax spending for programs outside of tax law’s purview.46  
However, the medical expense deduction may be a valuable method of addressing 
significant differences in taxpayers’ financial positions.  Whether or not we find the 
genesis of the deduction in the definition of consumption, or qualify it as an expenditure, 
it can still be justified by equitable principles within tax law. 
C. Criticism of the Medical Expense Deduction 
The most noteworthy condemnation of the medical expense deduction is the 
1979 article written by Professor Mark Kelman in response to Professor Andrews.47  
Kelman argues that non-income-seeking expenditures that are not consumption do not 
exist.48  Kelman maintains that net receipts minus the cost of obtaining the receipts is 
“tautologically” income.49  Kelman’s article was written specifically to attack Andrews’ 
position.  However, his comments can easily be extended to other defenses of the medical 
expense deduction.  Kelman advances several criticisms of Andrews, the most important 
of which I will address here.  First, Kelman notes that it is not always clear that a 
taxpayer has purchased medical services because of a departure from a baseline state of 
good health.50  A taxpayer may choose to make medical purchases without being in poor 
health.51  Second, Kelman points out a problem of mixed motives–namely, that income 
                                                      
43 See Kahn, supra note 10, at 17, 27; Turnier, supra note 21, at 1706-07.  The Joint Committee on 
Taxation has described the purpose of the medical expense deduction as follows:  “The primary rationale for 
allowing an itemized deduction for medical expenses is that ‘extraordinary’ medical costs–those in excess of 
a floor designed to exclude predictable, recurring expenses–reflect economic hardship, beyond the 
individual’s control, which reduces the ability to pay Federal income tax.”  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 
97TH CONG., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL 
RESPONSIBILITY ACT OF 1982, at 24 (J. Comm. Print 1982).  But see Laura E. Cunningham, National Health 
Insurance and the Medical Deduction, 50 TAX L. REV. 237, 250-51 (1995) (arguing that deductions actually 
taken under § 213 often go far beyond those expenses which can properly be deemed extraordinary). 
44 See Kahn, supra note 10. 
45 See STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, 110TH CONG., A RECONSIDERATION OF TAX EXPENDITURE 
ANALYSIS 52 (J. Comm. Print 2008) (“Some tax expenditures may be designed to provide a better measure of 
what Congress deems to be the correct measure of ‘ability to pay,’ and thereby improve horizontal equity. 
For example, the deduction for medical expenses in excess of 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income may 
reflect a determination that two taxpayers with the same gross income are not similarly situated if one has 
high medical expenses and the other does not.”). 
46 See supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text. 
47 Kelman, supra note 30. 
48 Id. at 834. 
49 Id.  
50 Id. at 862. 
51 Id.  See also id. at 867 (suggesting that the purchase of preventative care does not necessarily 
result from the taxpayer’s poor health). 
2011] DEDUCTING THE COST OF SEX REASSIGNMENT SURGERY 93 
and taste factor into many purchases of medical services.52  Wealthy taxpayers are more 
likely to spend money in a medical setting for things that are not medically important (for 
example, private hospital rooms53 or more expensive doctors54).  These are arguments 
about the voluntariness of medical expenses. 55   Defenses of the medical expense 
deduction rely on the assumption that differences in medical spending reflect differences 
in need rather than choices among indulgences. 56   Kelman’s criticism essentially 
questions whether medical expenses truly affect taxpayers’ ability to pay.57  If certain 
medical expenses are discretionary luxuries unrelated to disease, they do not represent a 
financial burden and accommodating them through the medical expense deduction is not 
progressive. 
Professor Louis Kaplow has attacked the medical expense deduction as a 
misallocation of resources due to its status as a government-funded alternative to private 
health insurance.58  According to Kaplow, this substitution discourages the purchase of 
private health insurance, which leads to increasing medical costs and unnecessary risk-
taking by taxpayers.59  However, this line of argument depends on the impropriety of the 
deduction rather than establishing its weakness.60  If the medical expense deduction is a 
tool for measuring taxpayers’ ability to pay, the deduction is not a misallocation of 
resources.  On the contrary, denying the deduction would be a misallocation of resources 
because it might dissuade taxpayers from purchasing essential medical care–the opposite 
effect that the deduction appears designed to promote.61 
D. The Role of the Medical Expense Deduction 
The question of whether the medical expense deduction is a tax expenditure may 
not be crucial to determine if it is an acceptable policy.  Professors David A. Weisbach 
and Joseph Nussim argue that it is irrelevant whether government spending programs that 
                                                      
52 Id. at 864-68.  See also Cunningham, supra note 43, at 250-51 (discussing the problem of mixed 
motives). 
53 Kelman, supra note 30, at 864, 866; see also Cunningham, supra note 43, at 250; Griffith, supra 
note 11, at 371 n.159. 
54 See Kelman, supra note 30, at 866. 
55 See Cunningham, supra note 43, at 250 (“Although a utilitarian ethic supports excluding the 
costs of medical care from the tax base, there remains a significant problem in distinguishing ‘true’ medical 
expenses, which imply essential and involuntary expenses, from ‘luxury’ medical expenses, which reflect an 
individual's consumption choices.”). 
56 See, e.g., Andrews, supra note 4, at 336 (“The deduction will reflect differences in health only as 
they manifest themselves in financial terms by requiring substantially different levels of expenditure for 
medical services.  In this respect the deduction treats substantial medical expenses like a loss of earnings.”). 
57 See Cunningham, supra note 43, at 250-51. 
58 Kaplow, supra note 29, at 1493-99.  See also Cunningham, supra note 43, at 253 (“Section 213 
can be viewed as a form of free government insurance, under which the government acts as a co-insurer to 
the extent of the tax rate times the amount of the allowable deduction.”); Kelman, supra note 30, at 832-33; 
SURREY & MCDANIEL, supra note 5, at 79.  Cf. Andrew Blair-Stanek, Note, Using Insurance Law and Policy 
to Interpret the Tax Code’s Loss and Medical Expense Provisions, 26 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 309 (2007) 
(advocating for using traditional insurance law concepts to reinterpret the medical expense deduction).  For 
further discussion of the relationship between the medical expense deduction and traditional health insurance 
see infra Part III.A.2. 
59 Kaplow, supra note 29, at 1493-99.  See also STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 42, at 
23.  Cf. Robert K. Lu, Note, Gross Negligence and the Medical Expense Deduction, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 845 
(1998) (arguing that barring the medical expense deduction in cases where the taxpayer is grossly negligent 
would increase social welfare). 
60 See Bittker, supra note 41, at 199 (responding to a similar position in JAMES M. BUCHANAN, THE 
PUBLIC FINANCES 226 (3d ed., 1970)). 
61 See Bittker, supra note 41, at 199.   
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are executed via the tax system comply with independent tax norms.62  Instead, they 
contend that the decision to implement such programs through a tax expenditure or a 
direct grant is merely a matter of institutional design.63  The government will inevitably 
decide to subsidize or encourage any number of activities.64  The point of Weisbach’s and 
Nussim’s analysis is to emphasize that the real concern is whether the form of the subsidy 
is supportable given overall government policy and structure, not how the subsidy fits 
within an ideal income tax.65  In other words, Weisbach and Nussim embrace Surrey’s 
assertion that tax expenditures are nothing more than direct grants disguised. 66  
Nonetheless, they find that providing for these direct grants through the tax system may 
be preferable.67  Direct subsidies through the tax system may be desirable because they 
take advantage of the preexisting tax infrastructure for their administration and thus are 
arguably simpler to implement.68  The medical expense deduction is evidence of a 
government spending policy to mitigate the burden of larger-than-average medical 
expenses for taxpayers for whom the strain of such a burden relates to disease.  Under 
Weisbach’s and Nussim’s analysis, it is immaterial whether it is a tax expenditure.69  
Instead, it is important that there are advantages to spending via tax expenditure rather 
than direct grant.70  In particular, the tax system and evaluation of the burden of large 
medical expenses both require large-scale information and financial processing, reliance 
on levels of income, and some form of wealth redistribution.71  Thus, there are significant 
benefits of coordination in implementing a subsidy for medical expenses through the tax 
                                                      
62 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 7. 
63 See id. at 958 (“If the underlying policy is held constant, there are no effects of putting a program 
into or taking a program out of the tax system even if doing so hurts or enhances traditional notions of tax 
policy.  Welfare is the same regardless of whether the program is formally part of the tax system or is located 
somewhere else in the government.  If we mistakenly look only at the tax system instead of overall 
government policy, we will draw the wrong conclusions.”). 
64 See id. at 964. 
65 See id. at 963-64.  But see J. Clifton Fleming, Jr. & Robert J. Peroni, Reinvigorating Tax 
Expenditure Analysis and its International Dimension, 27 VA. TAX REV. 437, 468-84 (2008) (criticizing 
Weisbach and Nussim for disregarding the issue of whether something is in fact a tax expenditure before 
turning to the benefit of its implementation via tax policy instead of with a direct grant). 
66 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 7, at 978-82.  But see Daniel N. Shaviro, Rethinking Tax 
Expenditures and Fiscal Language, 57 TAX L. REV. 187, 207-13 (2004) (arguing that tax expenditures are not 
equivalent to direct spending). 
67 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 7, at 978-82. 
68 Id.  But see Edward D. Kleinbard, The Congress within the Congress: How Tax Expenditures 
Distort Our Budget and Our Political Processes, 36 OHIO N.U.L. REV. 1, 3 (2010) (“Tax expenditures have 
grown in importance to the point where they are now the dominant instruments for implementing new 
discretionary spending policies.  While it is certainly true that some forms of government intervention are 
best delivered through the tax system, it cannot be the case that neutral design principles would lead to the 
current situation, where we spend more than twice as much through tax expenditures as we do through old-
fashioned explicit spending programs.  As a result, tax expenditures are filling a role that goes well beyond 
just another available policy device in Congress's toolkit.”). 
69 See Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 7, at 975 (“[I]f we are going to subsidize medical expenses, 
whether it is desirable to do so through the tax system should not depend on whether a medical expense 
deduction meets the definition of income.”).  But see Fleming & Peroni, supra note 65, at 469 (“A significant 
problem with [Weisbach’s and Nussim’s] argument is that to determine whether a particular government 
subsidy, such as a deduction for medical expenses, is best delivered as a direct expenditure or as a subsidy 
through the tax system, we need to know the tax system's content and structure so that we can evaluate the 
effectiveness of the tax expenditure alternative and the costs it imposes on the tax system.”). 
70 Weisbach & Nussim, supra note 7, at 959. 
71 See id. 
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system.72  The remaining issue is which medical expenses are appropriately mitigated 
through this subsidy. 
Andrews acknowledges that some medical expenses will have a notable 
component of personal gratification.73  However, it is not possible to avoid all such 
borderline problems.74  An apt comparison is the often blurry line between business and 
personal expenses when evaluating the business expense deduction.75  Just as a taxpayer 
makes certain medical decisions influenced by personal rather than medical factors, he 
may incur business expenses related to his personal values.76  For example, he may 
choose a more luxurious office location, or first class business travel.77  Nonetheless, the 
element of personal gratification does not mean these are not real medical expenses.78  To 
this point, Kelman answers that the comparison is misleading because the business 
expense deduction, unlike the medical expense deduction, is an integral part of the tax 
structure.79  However, Kelman merely describes administrative issues of pinpointing 
exactly which medical expenses are appropriately deductible, instead of problems with 
the deduction in general.80  If the problem is that taxpayers make quasi-medical decisions 
because of personal taste, the suitable response to this problem is to refine the deduction 
to account as accurately as possible for only those medical problems that affect 
taxpayers’ ability to pay.81  The 1990 amendment of § 213 to exclude cosmetic surgery 
expenses was just such a refinement.82 
III. STRUCTURE AND SCOPE OF THE MEDICAL EXPENSE DEDUCTION 
A. General Statutory Scheme 
1. Mechanics of the Deduction 
Section 213 provides a deduction for expenses paid for the medical care of the 
taxpayer, his or her spouse, and dependents if the taxpayer is not compensated for the 
expenses by insurance or otherwise (e.g., by a tortfeasor).83  Qualified expenses may be 
deducted if the taxpayer elects to itemize deductions, and only to the extent that such 
                                                      
72 See id. 
73 Andrews, supra note 4, at 337. 
74 Id. 
75 See Bittker, supra note 41, at 199; Griffith, supra note 11, at 371 n.159; Kelman, supra note 30, 
at 876-79.  But see Joel S. Newman, The Medical Expense Deduction: A Preliminary Postmortem, 53 S. CAL. 
L. REV. 787, 788-89 (1979) (arguing that the medical expense deduction is dissimilar to the business expense 
deduction because the medical expense deduction has no inherent limiting factors like the profit 
maximization factor that controls business decisions). 
76 See Bittker, supra note 41, at 199. 
77 See id. 
78 See id. 
79 Kelman, supra note 30, at 876. 
80 See Kahn, supra note 10, at 31.  Even Kelman conceded that some deduction for medical care 
might be supportable.  Kelman, supra note 30, at 834.   
81 See Kahn, supra note 10, at 29-31 (suggesting that basing the deduction on a percentage of AGI 
is because of Congress’ recognition that medical expenses will have certain pleasurable attributes, 
particularly in the case of wealthy taxpayers).  But cf. James W. Colliton, The Medical Expense Deduction, 
34 WAYNE L. REV. 1307, 1310 (1988) (arguing that the 7.5% floor disproportionately advantages lower 
income taxpayers, who can exceed the floor by spending a lower amount).   
82 See infra Part III.B. 
83 I.R.C. § 213(a) (West Supp. 2010) (“There shall be allowed as a deduction the expenses paid 
during the taxable year, not compensated for by insurance or otherwise, for medical care of the taxpayer, his 
spouse, or a dependent . . . to the extent that such expenses exceed 7.5 percent of adjusted gross income.”). 
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expenses exceed 7.5% of the taxpayer’s AGI, or 10% of his AGI for the purposes of the 
AMT.84   
The deduction covers “medical care,” defined as amounts paid “for the diagnosis, 
cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease, or for the purpose of affecting any 
structure or function of the body.”85  Medical expenses for “transportation primarily for 
and essential to medical care”86 and expenses for prescription drugs and insulin also 
qualify.87  Expenses for lodging while away from home receiving medical care are 
eligible for the deduction if the lodging is primarily for and essential to the medical care, 
if the medical care is provided by a physician in a licensed hospital or medical care 
facility, and if the travel has no significant element of personal pleasure.88  No deduction 
is allowed for lodging that is lavish or extravagant and the deduction is limited to $50 
“for each night for each individual.”89 
Section 213(d)(9) explicitly excludes cosmetic surgery from the definition of 
medical care.  “Cosmetic surgery” is “any procedure which is directed at improving the 
patient’s appearance and does not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body 
or prevent or treat illness or disease.”90  However, expenses incurred for cosmetic 
surgery are deductible if the “the surgery or procedure is necessary to ameliorate a 
deformity arising from, or directly related to, a congenital abnormality, a personal injury 
resulting from an accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease.”91 
Many expenses toe the line between deductible “medical care” and “personal, 
living, or family expenses” which are nondeductible under § 262, unless otherwise 
expressly provided.92  The regulations do not authorize deductions for expenditures that 
are “merely beneficial to the general health of an individual,” such as the cost of a 
vacation; deductions “will be confined strictly to expenses incurred primarily for the 
                                                      
84 Id.; I.R.C. § 56(b)(1)(B) (West Supp. 2010). 
85 I.R.C. § 213(d)(1)(A) (2006). 
86 Id. § 213(d)(1)(B) (2006).  See, e.g., Winderman v. Comm’r, 32 T.C. 1197 (1959) (allowing 
deduction for transportation expenses for Los Angeles resident to travel to New York City to see a specific 
doctor in whom he had confidence); Rev. Rul. 58-533, 1958-2 C.B. 108 (allowing deduction for cost of 
parents’ trip to visit institutionalized child if the child’s doctor deemed regular visits essential to the child’s 
therapy).  If required for the patient’s travel, the transportation expenses of an accompanying nurse, family 
member or other attendant are also deductible.  Rev. Rul. 58-110, 1958-1 C.B. 155 (allowing deduction for 
transportation expenses of an elderly patient and her required nurse to travel on physician’s 
recommendation). 
87 I.R.C. § 213(b) (2006).  A prescription drug is “a drug or biological which requires a prescription 
of a physician for its use by an individual.”  Id. § 213(d)(3).  See also Rev. Rul. 2003-58, 2003-1 C.B. 959 
(noting that § 213(b) does not apply to medical equipment, supplies, or diagnostic devices–such as crutches, 
bandages, or blood sugar test kits–that may be purchased without a physician’s prescription).  Non-
prescription drugs other than insulin are nondeductible in part because “non-prescription drugs are more 
likely to represent expenses for ordinary consumption than ‘extraordinary’ medical costs that should be 
deductible.”  STAFF OF J. COMM. ON TAX’N, supra note 43, at 25. 
88 I.R.C. § 213(d)(2) (2006).  
89 Id.  
90 Id. § 213(d)(9)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
91 Id. § 213(d)(9)(A) (2006).  See infra Part III.B.2 for further discussion of the exclusion of 
cosmetic surgery expenses. 
92 See Stringham v. Comm’r, 12 T.C. 580, 584-85 (1949) (“The real difficulty arises in connection 
with determining the deductibility of expenses which, depending on the peculiar facts of each case, may be 
classified as either ‘medical’ or ‘personal’ in nature . . . .  [W]here the expenses sought to be deducted may be 
either medical or personal in nature, the ultimate determination must be primarily one of fact.”).  
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prevention or alleviation of a physical or mental defect or illness.”93  In Havey v. 
Commissioner,94 the Tax Court rejected a deduction for a couple’s vacation expenses, 
even though the trips were recommended by the wife’s doctor after she suffered a 
coronary occlusion.  The court opined that:   
To be deductible as a medical expense, there must be a direct or 
proximate relation between the expenses and the diagnosis, cure, 
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease or the expense must have 
been incurred for the purpose of affecting some structure or function of 
the body. . . . It seems clear to us that the deduction in question may be 
claimed only where there is a health or body condition coming within the 
statutory concept and where the expense was incurred primarily for the 
prevention or alleviation of such condition.  An incidental benefit is not 
enough.95 
Thus, even if the taxpayer is ill, expenses on the boundary between medical and 
personal are not deductible if the medical benefit is remote or incidental.96  The Tax 
Court developed the prevailing test for deductibility in Jacobs v. Commissioner, holding 
that a taxpayer seeking a § 213 deduction must show:  (1) “the present existence or 
imminent probability of a disease, defect or illness–mental or physical,”97 and (2) that the 
expenses incurred are “directly or proximately related to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of the disease or illness.”98  When the expenses provide both 
medical and personal benefits, the taxpayer must also pass a “but for” test and show 
                                                      
93 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979).  See Brown v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 551 (1974) (finding 
amounts paid for Scientology processing and auditing and related travel expenses not deductible because the 
nature of the services was that of personal counseling for general well-being rather than psychotherapy).  But 
see Rev. Rul. 62-210, 1962-2 C.B. 89 (allowing deduction for clarinet lessons to ameliorate child’s 
malocclusion).  Expenses incurred for exercise, such as for athletic devices, lessons, or club memberships are 
often denied deductibility because of this principle.  See, e.g., France v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 
(1980), aff’d per curiam, 690 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1982) (disallowing expenses incurred for dancing lessons 
recommended by physician); Altman v. Comm’r, 53 T.C. 487 (1969) (holding the cost of getting to and from 
a golf course not deductible because the taxpayer, an emphysema sufferer, could get exercise otherwise); 
Adler v. Comm’r, 330 F.2d 91 (9th Cir. 1964) (finding dancing lessons for taxpayer with varicose veins 
nondeductible).  Nonetheless, some taxpayers have been successful in deducting the costs of therapeutic 
swimming pools.  Compare Cherry v. Comm’r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1031 (1983) (allowing deduction for 
operating expenses of swimming pool used by taxpayer to alleviate emphysema and bronchitis) with Haines 
v. Comm’r, 71 T.C. 644 (1979) (denying deduction for the cost of a swimming pool used by taxpayer with a 
fractured leg requiring physical therapy because of lack of showing that the primary purpose for the pool was 
medically therapeutic rather than for general health and convenience). 
94 12 T.C. 409 (1949). 
95 Id. at 412-13. 
96 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 813 (1974) (finding that expenses of divorce are not 
deductible, even though recommended by psychiatrist because of the negative repercussions of marriage on 
taxpayer’s mental health); Rabb v. Comm’r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1972) (denying deduction for shopping 
trips as “milieu therapy”).  
97 Jacobs, 62 T.C. at 818.   
98 Id.  See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2002-19, 2002-16 I.R.B. 778 (finding that expenses paid for a weight-loss 
program as treatment for a specific disease, including obesity or hypertension diagnosed by a physician, are 
deductible if the taxpayer has been directed by a physician to lose weight as treatment, but that diet food is 
not deductible); Rev. Rul. 99-28, 1999-1 C.B. 1269 (allowing a deduction for expenses incurred to stop 
smoking, including smoking-cession programs and prescription drugs to alleviate the effects of nicotine 
withdrawal, because nicotine is addictive and smoking is detrimental to the health of the smoker). 
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“both that the expenditures were an essential element of the treatment and that they 
would not have otherwise been incurred for nonmedical reasons.”99 
2.  Relationship to Health Insurance 
Section 213(d)(1)(D) provides that the term “medical care” covers “insurance . . . 
covering medical care.”  Under this provision, taxpayers may deduct premium payments 
for insurance that covers any items that would qualify as “medical care” within the 
meanings of §§ 213(d)(1)(A) and 213(d)(1)(B).  Insurance premiums deductible under 
§ 213 are combined with other qualified medical costs in applying the nondeductible 
floor.100  The cost of employer-provided health insurance is deductible as a business 
expense for employers and excludable as a fringe benefit for employees.101  Self-
employed taxpayers may deduct some or all of the insurance expenses incurred for the 
taxpayer, his spouse, and his dependents under § 162(l), to the extent that the deduction 
does not exceed the taxpayer’s earned income from the trade or business providing the 
insurance.  This is allowed as a business expense deduction and corresponds to the 
exclusion of employer-sponsored insurance from employee gross income.102  Because 
premiums paid by families are deductible subject to the nondeductible floor, whereas 
employer-provided (including self-employed) insurance is fully deductible, there are 
some inconsistencies in the tax treatment of health insurance between different groups of 
taxpayers. 
In many ways, § 213 acts as a government-funded alternative to private 
insurance.103  However, the scope of coverage under § 213 is considerably broader than 
that of private health insurance or traditional government-funded health insurance (e.g., 
Medicare and Medicaid).104  For example, Medicare and Medicaid, as well as many 
private insurers, deny coverage for medical services that are not medically necessary.105  
Conversely, § 213 does not require that treatment be medically necessary.  Instead, it 
allows a deduction for medical care that is primarily for the prevention or alleviation of a 
disease, even if medical insurers would not find the treatment necessary.106  The medical 
                                                      
99 Jacobs, 62 T.C. at 819 (emphasis omitted).  See, e.g., Ende v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1096 
(1975) (denying deduction for cost of attending ballet school for child with scoliosis in the absence of 
evidence that the child would not have taken ballet lessons without the disorder). 
100 See I.R.C. § 213(a) (West Supp. 2010). 
101 See id. § 106(a) (2006) (“[G]ross income of an employee does not include employer-provided 
coverage under an accident or health plan.”); Treas. Reg. § 1.106-1 (1960) (“The gross income of an 
employee does not include contributions which his employer makes to an accident or health plan for 
compensation (through insurance or otherwise) to the employee for personal injuries or sickness incurred by 
him, his spouse, or his dependents . . . .”). 
102 To prevent the self-employed taxpayer from benefitting twice, he is denied the deduction if he 
or his spouse is eligible to participate in an employer-subsidized health plan.  I.R.C. § 162(l)(2)(B) (West 
Supp. 2010). 
103 See supra notes 58-61 and accompanying text (discussing criticism of the medical expense 
deduction on this account). 
104 See Katherine T. Pratt, Inconceivable?  Deducting the Costs of Fertility Treatment, 89 CORNELL 
L. REV. 1121, 1170-71 (2004).   
105 See id.  Medical services that are not “reasonable and necessary” for the treatment or prevention of illness, 
42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A), (B) (2000), are excluded from federal Medicare.  Medicaid similarly limits 
coverage.  See 42 C.F.R. § 440.230(d) (1981) (“The agency may place appropriate limits on a service based 
on such criteria as medical necessity.”).  Cf. Mark A. Hall & Gerard F. Anderson, Health Insurers’ 
Assessment of Medical Necessity, 140 U. PA. L. REV., 1637, 1638 n.4 (1992) (explaining that the term 
“medically necessary” is generally used by health insurers to mean medically appropriate rather than strictly 
necessary, and incorporates concepts such as cost effective care and accepted medical practice). 
106 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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expense deduction is rather comprehensive in its embrace of most expenses that can be 
legitimately tied to specific health conditions, including many categories of expenses that 
are not covered by traditional health insurance.  For example, § 213 covers expenses for 
transportation, as well as meals and lodging, when they are essential to the medical 
care. 107   Taxpayers have successfully deducted the cost of playing a musical 
instrument,108 legal fees to commit a mentally ill person,109 and the excess cost of food 
taken solely to alleviate or treat illness. 110   Many kinds of health-related capital 
expenditures are treated favorably under § 213.  Notably, taxpayers have successfully 
deducted the cost of therapeutic swimming pools111 in addition to various medically-
required residence alterations, including “expenses incurred by a physically handicapped 
individual for removing structural barriers in his or her personal residence for the purpose 
of accommodating his or her handicapped condition.”112  The cost of servicing such items 
is deductible as well.113  Deductible medical care may also be provided by a non-medical 
professional, such as an acupuncturist,114 unlicensed chiropractor,115 or Christian Science 
practitioner.116  Thus, the purview of § 213 is significantly broader than that of traditional 
health insurance. 
B. Cosmetic Surgery 
1. Early Treatment of Cosmetic Surgery 
Expenses incurred for cosmetic surgery that is not necessary to ameliorate a 
deformity arising from or directly related to a congenital abnormality, personal injury 
resulting from accident or trauma, or disfiguring disease are nondeductible under 
§ 213(d).  However, before § 213(d) was added in 1990, the courts and the I.R.S. had 
allowed deductions for cosmetic procedures, due to the statutory definition of “medical 
care” including procedures “for the purpose of affecting any structure or function of the 
body.”  In Mattes v. Commissioner, the taxpayer was permitted to deduct the cost of a 
surgical hair transplant performed by a physician as a purely cosmetic remedy for the 
taxpayer’s baldness.117  Although the court acknowledged that baldness is not a health 
risk,118 it reasoned that, “since the expense is for a medical surgical treatment to correct a 
specific physiological condition . . . it is deductible under section 213 without the 
                                                      
107 See supra notes 86-89 and accompanying text. 
108 Rev. Rul. 62-210, 1962-2 C.B. 89 (allowing deduction for clarinet lessons to ameliorate a 
child’s malocclusion). 
109 Gerstacker v. Comm’r, 414 F.2d 448 (6th Cir. 1969) (finding legal expenses of obtaining 
guardianship for a mental patient unwilling to seek treatment deductible). 
110 Kalb v. Comm’r, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 1511 (1978) (permitting deduction for the excess cost of 
high-protein food medically required due to abnormally low blood sugar); Cohn v. Comm’r, 38 T.C. 387 
(1962), nonacq. 1963-2 C.B. 6 (allowing deduction for the additional cost of restaurant-prepared salt-free 
meals for a taxpayer with heart problems).  But see Becher v. Comm’r, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 683 (1987) 
(denying deduction for the excess cost of organic food, despite taxpayer’s physician’s recommendation that 
taxpayer eat such food due to various chemical allergies). 
111 See supra note 93. 
112 S. Rep. No. 99-313, at 59, reprinted in 1986-3 C.B. (vol. 3) 1, 59. 
113 Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(iii) (1979).  See also Rev. Rul. 83-33, 1983-1 C.B. 70 (permitting 
deduction for the cost of maintaining a medically therapeutic swimming pool). 
114 Rev. Rul. 72-593, 1972-2 C.B. 180. 
115 Rev. Rul. 63-91, 1963-1 C.B. 54. 
116 Rev. Rul. 55-261, 1955-1 C.B. 307.  But see Tautolo v. Comm’r, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1198 (1975) 
(disallowing deduction for treatment by native Samoan healers because it was for general health); Ring v. 
Comm’r, 23 T.C. 950 (1955) (denying deduction for trip to a shrine). 
117 Mattes v. Comm’r, 77 T.C. 650 (1981). 
118 Id. at 655. 
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necessity of examining a taxpayer’s motive for such treatment.  In such context, we need 
not draw the fine line between medical and personal expenses.”119  The I.R.S. similarly 
endorsed the deductibility of cosmetic procedures.  For example, a taxpayer was allowed 
to deduct expenses incurred for a face-lift procedure, even though not recommended by 
the taxpayer’s physician.120  In its ruling, the I.R.S. commented that, “[s]ince the purpose 
of the taxpayer's operation was to affect a structure of the human body, its cost is an 
amount paid for medical care.”121 
2. Enactment of § 213(d)(9) 
In 1990, Congress enacted section 11342(a) of the Omnibus Budget 
Reconciliation Act of 1990,122 which amended § 213 to add § 213(d)(9).  The amendment 
denies deductions for cosmetic surgery except under certain specified conditions.  The 
Senate Finance Committee report123 says that: 
[E]xpenses paid for cosmetic surgery or other similar procedures are not 
deductible medical expenses, unless the surgery or procedure is 
necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising from, or directly related to . . 
. disfiguring disease. . . .  Thus, under the provision, procedures such as 
hair removal electrolysis, hair transplants, liposuction, and face lift 
operations generally are not deductible.  In contrast, expenses for 
procedures that are medically necessary to promote the proper function 
of the body and only incidentally affect the patient’s appearance or 
expenses for treatment of a disfiguring condition arising from . . . disease 
(such as reconstructive surgery following removal of a malignancy) 
continue to be deductible.124 
The exclusion of most cosmetic surgery procedures is an attempt by Congress to 
separate essential medical expenses, such as those used to treat disease, from those 
expenses that represent elective consumption by the taxpayer in the form of medical 
expenses.125  Because the former expenses affect a taxpayer’s ability to pay, they alone 
are the proper subject of the medical expense deduction.126 
Under § 213(d)(9), procedures that meaningfully promote the proper function of 
the body, or treat or prevent disease or illness, are not cosmetic surgery, and thus are still 
deductible, even when they improve physical appearance. 127   In Al-Murshidi v. 
                                                      
119 Id. at 656. 
120 Rev. Rul. 76-332, 1976-2 C.B. 81.  
121 Id.  See also Rev. Rul. 82-111, 1982-1 C.B. 48 (finding that hair transplants and hair removal by 
electrolysis are medical care, but tattooing and ear piercing are not, because–as the skin is penetrated only 
superficially–they do not sufficiently affect a structure or function of the body). 
122 Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-471. 
123 There was no formal report printed separately because the bill was brought to the Senate floor 
before a report could be printed.  Instead, the report was printed directly in the Congressional Record.  See 
136 CONG. REC. S15629 (1990). 
124 136 CONG. REC. S15629, S15711 (1990). 
125 See Newman, supra note 75, at 789-94 (describing legislative evidence that the deduction was 
conceived of in terms of the effect of medical expenses on the ability to pay, but arguing that the deduction 
lost this position over time).  
126 See supra Part II.B.1. 
127 See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959 (allowing a deduction for expenses incurred for 
laser eye surgery to remedy myopia because the surgery “meaningfully promotes the proper function of the 
body”); Rev. Rul. 2002-19, 2002-16 I.R.B. 778 (finding that expenses paid for a weight-loss program as 
treatment for a specific disease, including obesity or hypertension diagnosed by a physician, are deductible if 
the taxpayer has been directed by a physician to lose weight as treatment).  But see O’Donnabhain v. 
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Commissioner, the Tax Court allowed the taxpayer a deduction for her expenses incurred 
for three surgeries, including liposuction, to remove a mass of loose-hanging skin 
remaining after the taxpayer independently lost over 100 pounds.128  The court reasoned 
that: 
Petitioner was 100 pounds overweight and suffered from morbid obesity.  
Obesity is well recognized in the medical community as a serious 
disease. . . . Furthermore, petitioner continued to suffer from the effects 
of the above-described skin mass that was a deformity.  This mass was 
not merely unsightly, it was prone to infection and disease and interfered 
with the petitioner’s daily life. . . . The procedures that petitioner 
underwent meaningfully promoted the proper function of her body and 
treated her disease.129 
 
Taxpayers are also able to deduct expenses for cosmetic surgery–procedures that 
improve appearance, but do not meaningfully promote the proper function of the body or 
treat disease or illness–if those procedures are necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising 
from (or directly related to) a congenital abnormality, personal injury resulting from 
accident or trauma, or a disfiguring disease.130  For instance, the I.R.S. permits deduction 
for the expenses of breast reconstruction following a taxpayer’s mastectomy as treatment 
for breast cancer because reconstruction “ameliorates a deformity directly related to a 
disease.”131  However, expenses for teeth whitening are not a permitted deduction, 
because tooth discoloration is “not a deformity and is not caused by a disfiguring disease 
or treatment.”132  
The meaning and extent of the statutory exclusion of cosmetic surgery have not 
been fully addressed since the 1990 amendment.  Despite a handful of Tax Court and 
I.R.S. decisions on the matter, it is not yet entirely clear when a medical procedure that 
improves appearance is deductible under § 213.  A medical procedure that improves 
appearance should be excluded from the statutory definition of cosmetic surgery if it 
passes two hurdles.  First, the procedure should be prescribed to the taxpayer by a 
medical professional as treatment for a specific disease or infirmity.  Second, a medical 
procedure that improves appearance should be generally accepted in the medical 
community as appropriate treatment for the disease for which it is prescribed.   
The first requirement corresponds to the maxim that deductible medical expenses 
are not those for the general health of the taxpayer or those with remote or incidental 
medical benefits, but instead are incurred for the explicit purpose of treating a concrete 
                                                                                                                                                 
Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010), acq., 2011-47 I.R.B. 2 (holding that breast augmentation surgery in connection 
with male to female SRS is nondeductible because it was for the purpose of improving appearance and not to 
treat disease). 
128 Al-Murshidi v. Comm'r, No. 4230-008, 2001 WL 1922698 (T.C. Dec. 13, 2001). 
129 Id. at 3. 
130 See I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(A) (2006). 
131 Rev. Rul. 2003-57, 2003-22 I.R.B. 959. 
132 Id.  See also I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 200344010 (Oct. 31, 2003) (“[T]reatment j is cosmetic surgery 
pursuant to § 213(d)(9)(B) because it will improve Taxpayer’s appearance without also meaningfully 
promoting the proper function of the body or preventing or treating illness or disease.  However, [treatment j 
will improve condition d], a deformity that arose from, or is directly related to, the congenital abnormalities . 
. . suffered by Taxpayer.  Thus, treatment j is [deductible].”). 
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medical problem.133  This is the same test that is applied to all medical expenses deducted 
under § 213.134   
The difficulty with procedures that improve appearance is that non-medical 
benefits from the procedures may be prevalent as well.  Thus, it is especially important in 
this area to carefully distinguish between disease-treating medical expenditures and 
quasi-medical expenses that do not trigger Congress’s policy for mitigating the financial 
burden of serious health problems.  Examining case law on the traditional scope of the 
medical expense deduction sheds some light on this issue.  Taxpayers have long been 
forbidden from deducting expenses that do not appear to be legitimately medical, even 
when those expenses are incurred due to the urging of medical professionals.  For 
example, taxpayers have been unsuccessful in attempts to deduct divorce expenses 
incurred to treat severe depression,135 shopping trips as therapy for neurosis,136 and 
dancing lessons to treat arthritis137–despite the fact that the aforementioned treatments 
were recommended by doctors for specific medical problems.  The unifying reason for 
the denial of deductions for these expenses is that the “treatments” were not accepted in 
the medical community as legitimate treatments for the diseases they purported to 
address.  Medical procedures that improve appearance are likely to be subject to exactly 
this problem.  Therefore, it is appropriate to demand that medical procedures that 
improve appearance be generally accepted as medical treatment for the illnesses for 
which they are prescribed.   
This does not mean that there needs to be consensus in the medical community 
about what is an appropriate course of treatment in any given case.  To the contrary, 
scientific and medical experts often dispute such questions.  Nonetheless, disagreement 
about suitable medical therapies can exist without this fact undermining the judgment of 
medical experts.138  If a treatment is recognized by a significant portion of the medical 
community, a court or the I.R.S. should defer to these medical experts in determining 
whether the treatment truly treats disease.  Given how broadly the medical expense 
deduction has been interpreted in the past,139 this can be a relatively low bar.  Those 
treatments that are endorsed by a noteworthy number of medical professionals as 
treatment for a specific disease may also improve appearance without a serious danger of 
being undertaken for their nonmedical benefits, and thus should escape being classified 
as cosmetic surgery under § 213(d)(9) when they are recommended by doctors. 
                                                      
133 See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. 
134 See id. 
135 Jacobs v. Comm’r, 62 T.C. 813 (1974). 
136 Rabb v. Comm’r, 31 T.C.M. (CCH) 476 (1972). 
137 France v. Comm’r, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 508 (1980), aff’d per curiam, 690 F.2d 68 (6th Cir. 1982). 
138 Cf. Margaret A. Berger & Lawrence M. Solan, The Uneasy Relationship Between Science and 
Law: An Essay and Introduction, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 847, 850-51 (2008) (“[S]cientists are not as certain as 
the lawyers would like them to be.  Although there are many scientific truths accepted in both the scientific 
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about the mechanisms that cause disease.”); Samuel R. Gross & Jennifer L. Mnookin, Expert Information 
and Expert Evidence: A Preliminary Taxonomy, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 141, 166-67 (2003) 
(“Knowledgeable people may disagree on what the answer is, or whether it is known, or even whether the 
question is answerable.  And even if there is a reasonably clear answer out there somewhere, it may be no 
mean feat to find it.  None of us can absorb even a tiny fraction of the general knowledge that exists in our 
extremely complex culture.  We have no choice but to rely on experts. . . .”). 
139 See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text. 
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The preceding analysis leaves open the possibility that taxpayers may be able to 
deduct expenses incurred to treat mental disease or illness that also happen to improve 
physical appearance.  Treatment of mental illness is eligible for § 213 deductions.140  The 
1990 amendment is directed at procedures that affect a structure or function of the body, 
but are not excluded from the definition of cosmetic surgery under § 213(d)(9)(B) by 
treating a disease or illness.  Medical procedures that affect a structure or function of the 
body but do not treat disease are cosmetic surgery if they improve appearance.141  
However, if a procedure that improves physical appearance also treats mental illness (a 
disease), it is not cosmetic surgery under § 213(d)(9)(B) and need not fulfill the 
requirements of § 213(d)(9)(A) in order to be deductible.   
Before the enactment of § 213(d)(9), taxpayers had been allowed to deduct 
treatment for mental illness where the treatment also affected physical appearance.  For 
example, before § 213(d)(9) was enacted, the I.R.S. approved a deduction for a 
physician-recommended wig for a child who had lost all of her hair as the result of 
disease, because the wig was thought essential for the girl’s mental health.142  Section 
213(d)(9) highlights a concern about medical procedures that improve appearance but are 
not undertaken for sufficiently medical reasons.  Under this scheme, the wig would be 
properly deductible now if it were both directed at treating the girl’s specific mental 
health problem and accepted as such treatment by a significant number of medical 
professionals.143  The wig appears to have been prescribed in order to remedy the 
patient’s specific mental affliction.  However, the wig is cosmetic if it is not also genuine 
medical treatment for her disease.  Because it improves appearance, its deductibility 
should turn on whether there is general agreement by medical professionals that a wig is 
a fitting course of treatment for the girl’s mental health problems.  If such agreement 
could be shown, the wig would escape classification as cosmetic under § 213(d)(9) due to 
its status as a treatment for disease.  Similarly, other procedures that treat specific mental 
diseases, but also improve appearance, should be deductible if there is adequate 
acceptance in the medical community for these treatments to be considered legitimately 
medical. 
IV. O’DONNABHAIN V. COMMISSIONER 
A. The Controversy and the Internal Revenue Service’s Position 
The taxpayer, Rhiannon O’Donnabhain, was born a genetic male.144  However, 
she145 was intensely uncomfortable in the male gender role from early childhood.146  
O’Donnabhain was first diagnosed with severe gender identity disorder (“GID”) as an 
adult, after having been married for more than twenty years and fathering three 
                                                      
140 See Treas. Reg. § 1.213-1(e)(1)(ii) (1979) (sanctioning § 213 deduction for treatment for mental 
defect or illness).  See also Starrett v. Comm’r, 41 T.C. 877 (1964) (allowing taxpayer with mental illness to 
deduct the cost of psychoanalysis). 
141 See I.R.C. § 213(d)(9)(B) (2006). 
142 Rev. Rul. 62-189, 1962-2 C.B. 88. 
143  This assumes that the wig was recommended to treat the girl’s mental health and not to 
ameliorate the deformity of baldness, which was the result of organic disease.  If the girl’s doctor endorsed 
her purchase of a wig for the latter purpose, the wig would be cosmetic, but potentially deductible under 
§ 213(d)(9)(A). 
144 O’Donnabhain v. Comm’r, 134 T.C. 34 (2010), acq., 2011-47 I.R.B. 2. 
145 O’Donnabhain self-identifies as female, and will be referred to throughout with the feminine 
pronoun. 
146 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 35. 
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children. 147   GID is a condition listed in the American Psychiatric Association’s 
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders148 (“DSM IV TR”), a diagnostic 
tool for mental disorders.  The DSM IV TR’s diagnostic criteria indicate that an 
individual has GID when he or she displays:  (1) a repeatedly stated desire to be, or 
insistence that he or she is, the other sex; (2) persistent discomfort with his or her sex or 
sense of inappropriateness in the gender role of that sex, including a preoccupation with 
getting rid of primary or secondary sex characteristics; (3) the absence of a physical 
intersex condition; and (4) clinically significant distress or impairment in social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning resulting from the disturbance.149  
GID is “severe” when the symptoms are particularly acute, or cause notable functional 
impairment.150  
O’Donnabhain’s psychotherapist recommended a course of treatment based on 
the Harry Benjamin Standards of Care (“Benjamin Standards”), published by the World 
Professional Association for Transgender Health, the most widespread standard of care 
for professionals working with people with GID.151  In accordance with the Benjamin 
Standards, the taxpayer received feminizing hormone therapy from 1997 through 2001.152  
In 2000, she decided to undertake the Benjamin Standards’ “real life” experience, which 
consists of presenting as female full time.153  At this point the taxpayer legally changed 
her name from Robert Donovan to Rhiannon O’Donnabhain.154  When these steps failed 
to assuage O’Donnabhain’s distress about her sex, her psychotherapist concluded that 
O’Donnabhain satisfied the Benjamin Standards’ criteria for sex reassignment surgery 
(“SRS”).155  In order to satisfy the Benjamin Standards, the taxpayer was examined and 
recommended for the surgery by a second licensed psychotherapist, and then referred to 
an experienced reconstructive surgeon who specialized in SRS.156  This surgeon also 
concluded that O’Donnabhain was a good candidate for SRS.157 
In October 2001, the taxpayer underwent SRS.158  This consisted of genital 
reconstruction surgery, which reconfigured O’Donnabhain’s male genitalia to create, in 
appearance and function, female genitalia. 159   The surgeon also performed breast 
augmentation surgery, to make her breasts (which had experienced notable development 
due to hormone therapy) more closely resemble female breasts.160 
On her 2001 federal income tax return, O’Donnabhain claimed her expenses for 
SRS, totaling more than $20,000 and not compensated by insurance or otherwise, as a 
§ 213 itemized deduction.  These expenses included the cost of the genital and breast 
surgeries, post-surgical stay at the surgeon’s facility, medical equipment, travel and 
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lodging for pre-surgical consultation and surgery, psychotherapy, consultation costs for 
her second referral, and hormone therapy.161  The I.R.S. initially gave O’Donnabhain a 
refund, but later disallowed the expenses on audit, finding that, under § 213(d)(9), the 
treatments were cosmetic in nature and thus nondeductible.162 
The I.R.S. relied on a number of alternative justifications to support its 
conclusion.  First, the I.R.S., while conceding that GID is a mental disorder, claimed that 
it is not a disease for the purposes of § 213, because it does not have an organic or 
physiological origin that reflects an abnormal structure or function of the body.163  
Second, the I.R.S. maintained that, based on the legislative history of § 213(d)(9), any 
medical procedure that is primarily directed towards improving appearance must be 
medically necessary to remain deductible under § 213.164  According to the Service, the 
taxpayer’s expenses did not treat disease because they were not medically necessary, and 
because there was controversy over the efficacy of SRS.165  Finally, the I.R.S. claimed 
that O’Donnabhain was misdiagnosed with GID, and therefore–even if SRS could be 
treatment for a disease–it was not in O’Donnabhain’s case.166 
B. The Tax Court Opinions 
The majority of the Tax Court allowed O’Donnabhain deductions for all her 
expenses except for the breast augmentation surgery.167  The judges authored six different 
opinions.   
Judge Gale, writing for the majority, reached that decision by applying the 
leading test for deductibility that the court formulated in Jacobs v. Commissioner.168  The 
threshold question under the Jacobs test is whether O’Donnabhain suffered from “the 
present existence or imminent probability of a disease, defect or illness–mental or 
physical.”169  The I.R.S. argued that O’Donnabhain was misdiagnosed with GID, and that 
GID is not a disease under § 213, because it does not have an organic or physiological 
origin that reflects an abnormal structure or function of the body.170  Judge Gale, relying 
on the expertise of O’Donnabhain’s doctors, dismissed the contention that O’Donnabhain 
was incorrectly diagnosed with GID.171  He also concluded that GID is a disease under 
§ 213.172  Although the I.R.S.’s position in this case seemed to be that § 213 encompasses 
only those diseases with physiological origins, the weight of authority–and the I.R.S.’s 
own regulation173–signaled the contrary.174  According to Judge Gale, mental disorders 
                                                      
161 Id. at 41-42. 
162 See CCA 200603025 (Jan. 20, 2006).  But see I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 8321042 (Feb. 18, 1983) 
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164 See CCA 200603025 (Jan. 20, 2006).  
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172 Id. at 55-63. 
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are diseases under § 213 without the requirement of a demonstrated physiological 
origin.175  Instead, mental conditions are diseases “where there [is] evidence that mental 
health professionals regard[] the condition as creating a significant impairment to normal 
functioning and warranting treatment.”176  In particular, the majority found GID to be a 
disease because it is a “widely recognized and accepted diagnosis in the field of 
psychiatry” and “a serious, psychologically debilitating condition” that is associated with 
self-mutilation and suicide if left untreated.177 
Under the Jacobs test, O’Donnabhain’s expenses must have been “directly or 
proximately related to the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of the 
disease or illness.”178  Judge Gale opined that the hormone therapy and genital surgery 
treated O’Donnabhain’s GID because, despite some controversy, they are well-
recognized and accepted therapies for severe GID according to the Benjamin Standards 
and many psychiatric professionals.179  The majority also noted that SRS is the only 
known effective treatment for severe GID, where psychotherapy alone is not effective.180  
O’Donnabhain also passes the Jacobs but-for test181 because, even if the hormone therapy 
and genital surgery had some nonmedical benefit, they were an essential element of her 
treatment of severe GID, and would not have occurred except to alleviate her suffering 
from GID.182  In response to the Service’s argument that, given the legislative history of 
§ 213(d)(9), medical procedures that affect appearance must be medically necessary to be 
deductible, Judge Gale concluded that the hormone therapy and genital surgery were 
necessary to treat O’Donnabhain’s GID. 183   Nonetheless, he found that, because 
O’Donnabhain had experienced sufficient breast growth during the hormone phase of her 
treatment, her breast augmentation surgery did not treat her disease and was therefore 
cosmetic and nondeductible.184 
In a concurring opinion, Judge Holmes agreed with the majority’s result, but 
disagreed with the majority’s reasoning that SRS is the proper and necessary treatment 
for GID.185  Judge Holmes, noting the medical controversy over SRS, would have relied 
on a test that determined deductibility based on whether the treatment is therapeutic to the 
taxpayer, based on the taxpayer’s good-faith, subjective motivation.186  Judge Holmes 
also took issue with the majority’s determination that SRS was medically necessary for 
O’Donnabhain, opining that “‘[M]edically necessary’ is a loaded phrase.  Construing it 
                                                                                                                                                 
174 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 56-58.  But see 2011-47 I.R.B. 2 (acquiescing in the O’Donnabhain 
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177 Id. at 61.   
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179 O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 65.  See also Judith S. Stern & Claire V. Merkine, Brian L. V. 
Administration for Children’s Services: Ambivalence Toward Gender Identity Disorder as a Medical 
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community). 
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puts us squarely, and unnecessarily, in the middle of a serious fight within the relevant 
scientific community . . . .”187 
Judge Goeke wrote a concurring opinion in which he reasoned that 
O’Donnabhain’s genital surgery was not cosmetic because it was not directed at 
improving her appearance, but rather was functional.188  However, he disagreed with the 
majority’s reasoning that left open the possibility of deductibility for surgeries directed 
solely at altering physical appearance if they alleviate mental pain.189  Therefore, while he 
upheld the taxpayer’s deductions for expenses incurred for SRS, he would have ruled that 
breast augmentation surgery is cosmetic as a matter of law.190 
Judges Foley and Gustafson both authored dissenting opinions.  Judge Gustafson 
grounded his analysis solely on the statutory language of § 213.191  Section 213(d)(1)(A) 
provides that medical care consists of “amounts paid for the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, 
treatment, or prevention of disease or for the purpose of affecting any structure or 
function of the body.”  Section 213(d)(9)(B) defines cosmetic surgery as “any procedure 
which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance, and does not meaningfully 
promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.”  Thus, 
Judge Gustafson argued that, because of the omission of the word “mitigate” in 
§ 213(d)(9)(B), procedures that improve appearance, but merely mitigate rather than 
prevent or treat illness, are not excluded from the definition of cosmetic surgery and are 
only deductible if they fall within the exception of § 213(d)(9)(A).192  To “treat” a 
disease, a procedure must “bear directly on the condition in question.”193  Mitigation, on 
the other hand, merely makes a disease less severe, or lessens the symptoms. 194  
Therefore, “‘treatment’ addresses underlying causes and ‘mitigation’ lessens effects.”195  
According to Judge Gustafson, SRS mitigated O’Donnabhain’s symptoms of GID, but 
was not a treatment because “A procedure that changes the patient’s healthy male body 
(in fact, that disables his healthy male body) and leaves his mind unchanged . . . has not 
treated his mental disease.”196 
Judge Foley’s dissenting opinion focused on the definition of cosmetic surgery 
found in § 213(d)(9)(B), which provides that “‘cosmetic surgery’ means any procedure 
which is directed at improving the patient’s appearance and does not meaningfully 
promote the proper function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.”197  Judge 
Foley contended that the statutory definition does not exclude from cosmetic surgery any 
procedure that treats disease.198  Instead, he argued that the test for cosmetic surgery set 
forth in 213(d)(9)(B) consists of two parts.199  The threshold question is whether the 
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procedure is directed at improving appearance.200  The second part of the test asks 
whether the procedure meaningfully promotes proper bodily function or prevents or treats 
disease.201  Judge Foley argued that this second part is disjunctive and indicates that a 
procedure that is directed at improving appearance is cosmetic surgery either if it does 
not meaningfully promote proper function of the body, or if it does not prevent or treat 
disease or illness.202  Even if SRS treated O’Donnabhain’s disease, it did not (according 
to Judge Foley) meaningfully promote the proper function of her body, and thus is within 
the definition of nondeductible cosmetic surgery in § 213(d)(9)(B).203 
C. Analysis 
The statutory language of § 213(d)(9) is not nearly as murky as one would 
believe after reading the various Tax Court opinions authored in O’Donnabhain.  Section 
213(d)(9)(B) excludes from the definition of “medical care” any procedure which is 
directed at improving appearance, but “does not meaningfully promote the proper 
function of the body or prevent or treat illness or disease.”  Such procedures are cosmetic 
surgery.  Judge Foley, ostensibly adhering to the plain language of § 213(d)(9), argued 
that in order for a procedure that improves appearance to avoid classification as cosmetic 
surgery, it must both meaningfully promote the proper function of the body, and treat or 
prevent disease or illness. 204   However, this interpretation itself ignores the plain 
language of the statute.  In order for Judge Foley’s interpretation to be correct, the statute 
must read (or we must interpret it to read), “does not meaningfully promote the proper 
function of the body or does not prevent or treat illness or disease.”  Judge Halpern, 
concurring in the result, authored an opinion that largely consisted of responses to 
arguments advanced by Judges Foley and Gustafson in their dissenting opinions.205  
Judge Halpern’s explanation of the logical fallacy of Judge Foley’s analysis is helpful: 
Because the second part of the test contains two expressions separated by 
“or”, that part of the test contains a “disjunction”; i.e., a compound 
proposition that is true if one of its elements is true.  Importantly, 
however, the second part of the test contains not just a disjunction (i.e., 
(p or q)), but rather the negation of a disjunction (i.e., not (p or q)).  
Judge Foley errs because he assumes that the expression “not (p or q)” is 
[logically] equivalent to the expression “(not p) or (not q)” . . . [when, in 
fact, its] equivalent is of the form “(not p) and (not q)”, which, 
substituting the relevant words, is:  “does not meaningfully promote the 
proper function of the body and does not prevent or treat illness or 
disease.”206 
In other words, Judge Foley is mistaken in his interpretation of the meaning of 
§ 213(d)(9), because he believes it to mean that a procedure that is directed at improving 
appearance is cosmetic if either it does not meaningfully promote the proper function of 
the body, or if it does not prevent or treat disease or illness.  In fact, based on the plain 
language of the statute, a procedure need satisfy only one of these conditions to avoid 
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being classified as cosmetic surgery.  Therefore, a procedure that meaningfully treats 
disease cannot be cosmetic surgery given the language of § 213(d)(9)(B). 
Judge Gustafson accepted both that O’Donnabhain had GID, a serious medical 
condition, and that the medical community favors SRS for patients with severe GID that 
have not responded to other therapies.207  However, he argued that § 213(d) excludes 
from the definition of cosmetic surgery therapies that treat disease, but not those that 
merely mitigate symptoms.208  According to Judge Gustafson, “treatment” is directed at 
the causes of a disease, whereas “mitigation” minimizes the effects of disease.209  In his 
opinion, SRS mitigates the symptoms of GID, but does not treat the disease because the 
underlying mental disorder is not addressed by SRS. 210  Judge Halpern responded to this 
point by arguing that for someone suffering from GID, the disease is the symptoms.211  
This may be true.  However, the response need not be limited to GID specifically.  For 
most mental disorders (and many physical disorders), treatment is limited to managing 
symptoms.  Scientific knowledge has not progressed to the point where doctors know 
exactly what causes all illness, or what can be done to cure the underlying diseases.212  
Expenses to treat mental illness are nonetheless deductible.213  GID is a mental disorder, 
and is subject to similar treatment regimes.  In order to allow a deduction for those 
expenses incurred to treat GID, a disease, we can only be as precise as current medical 
knowledge allows.  At present, SRS is the most effective known treatment for severe GID 
and is generally endorsed as such treatment by the medical community.214  O’Donnabhain 
was deemed a suitable candidate for SRS by three medical professionals.215  Therefore, 
O’Donnabhain’s SRS was treatment for disease for the purposes for § 213. 
Section 213(d)(9) provides that a procedure that treats disease remains deductible 
despite its effect on appearance because it is not included in the definition of cosmetic 
surgery.  Judge Holmes’ concurring opinion reveals his lack of appreciation of this 
important point.  Judge Holmes contended that the test for deductibility should be 
whether the treatment is therapeutic, given the taxpayer’s subjective, good-faith 
motivation.216  He argued this way because he saw no need to evaluate generally 
acceptable standards of care, and cited years of case law in which unorthodox expenses 
were nonetheless found deductible because they were subjectively therapeutic.217  This 
formulation, however, is much too broad and does not properly implement the statutory 
requirement.  A taxpayer may subjectively believe that a treatment that improves physical 
appearance is therapeutic to him, and yet the statute does not allow for deduction unless 
the treatment promotes proper function of the body, treats a disease, or ameliorates a 
specific type of deformity.  The enactment of § 213(d)(9) demonstrates Congress’s intent 
to deny deductibility to appearance-improving medical procedures that are not genuine 
treatment for disease.  In order to comply with this objective, the standard for 
deductibility must be more stringent than that proposed by Judge Holmes.  Specifically, 
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the appearance-improving procedure must be one that is both prescribed by a medical 
professional and accepted as bona fide medical treatment by a sufficient number of 
medical experts.218  In order to delineate between properly deductible expenses and quasi-
medical consumption unrelated to disease, it is necessary to rely on a more rigorous 
standard than any treatment that is subjectively believed to be therapeutic. 
Judge Goeke neglected to consider the appropriate role of medical experts in an 
adequate § 213(d)(9) analysis.  Judge Goeke’s error is the reverse of that of Judge 
Holmes in that he construed the statutory requirement too narrowly.  Judge Goeke was 
concerned that the majority’s analysis would improperly allow for the deductibility of 
procedures that are directed at altering physical appearance, if they alleviate any mental 
suffering.219  To address this problem, he would have ruled that the breast augmentation 
was per se cosmetic and nondeductible, but the genital surgery was functional rather than 
cosmetic.220  However, functionality is not a concern of § 213(d)(9).  O’Donnabhain’s 
expenses did improve her appearance, whether or not they also contributed some 
functionality.  The reason that they are deductible, under the statute, is because the 
procedures were doctor prescribed, medically accepted treatments for her GID.  If, in 
order to treat her GID, O’Donnabhain required breast augmentation, the statute could 
conceivably allow for that too.  This would depend on whether there was sufficient 
agreement among medical experts that breast augmentation could be appropriate 
treatment for severe GID.  In this case, the breast augmentation was not deductible 
because the taxpayer’s doctor had determined that she had had sufficient breast growth 
from hormones alone.221  Thus, the breast augmentation surgery was not prescribed to 
O’Donnabhain to treat her disease and is cosmetic surgery under § 213(d)(9)(B).  
Moreover, Judge Goeke appears to have made an error made by many of the Tax 
Court judges in their evaluation of this controversy.  Namely, it is both unusual and 
inappropriate for the court to engage in its own medical analysis.  The Tax Court judges 
are not experts in the medical field; they are experts in tax law.  While they may interpret 
and apply standards for the deductibility of medical procedures, this process does not 
invite independent medical scrutiny.  Instead, the Tax Court must rely on the judgment of 
medical experts in determining whether a procedure is directed at treating a specific 
medical condition.  If a procedure (such as O’Donnabhain’s SRS) is recommended by 
medical professionals to treat a taxpayer’s specific disease, and is generally accepted as 
such treatment by medical experts, it is deductible under § 213. 
Cosmetic surgery is excluded from the statutory definition of medical care 
because it usually consists of entirely elective procedures unrelated to disease, and is just 
another form of voluntary consumption that should be funded from after-tax dollars.  On 
the other hand, diseases are involuntary, and burdensome expenses to treat disease are 
medical expenses that merit a tax deduction.  The language and structure of § 213(d)(9) 
forms a dichotomy between those expenses which create a financial burden stemming 
from disease and those expenses that do not.  Because of the suspect status of cosmetic 
procedures, they must correct a deformity (i.e., result from a medical abnormality or 
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Body Dysmorphic Disorder, a mental condition in which the afflicted is preoccupied with a perceived 
physical deformity that does not exist.  Id. at 118 n.10 (Gustafson, J., dissenting). 
220 Id. at 101-04 (Goeke, J., concurring). 
221 Id. at 41. 
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disease process) in order to remain deductible.  Only those medical expenses that give 
rise to a financial burden originating in disease are the proper subject of the medical 
expense deduction.  Because GID is a disease, its treatment, as prescribed by doctors, is 
deductible.  Its status as a disease excludes appropriately-prescribed SRS from the 
disallowance of deduction for cosmetic surgery, and from any heightened requirement of 
medical necessity.  Allowing a § 213 deduction for expenses used for SRS is consistent 
both with the language of § 213, as well as the underlying policies that generally support 
§ 213 deductions.222   
Allowing a tax deduction for SRS also brings tax policy in line with health care 
knowledge and developments, and with developments in other areas of the law.  Many 
private employers now cover treatment for GID, including SRS, in their health care 
plans.223  This trend is supported by the American Medical Association, which announced 
in June 2008 that it supports private and public health insurance coverage for GID 
treatment.224  These developments are evidence of a growing consensus in the medical 
community that SRS is a medically legitimate treatment for disease.  Moreover, as the 
medical expense deduction is often broader in scope than health insurance coverage,225 it 
is natural and appropriate for tax policy to follow the judgment of health professionals.  
Many courts have also recognized the importance of SRS for individuals suffering from 
GID.  For example, an increasing number of prisoners have been able to obtain funding 
for SRS under the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against cruel and unusual 
punishment, which requires that prisoners receive adequate medical care.226  The fact that 
numerous U.S. Courts of Appeal have determined that GID presents serious medical need 
only underscores the fact that the Tax Court should not second-guess medical experts in 
their assessment that SRS is treatment for the disease of GID.  Courts have also found 
that SRS cannot be denied under State Medicaid plans as cosmetic surgery.227  While the 
Tax Court is not bound by these non-tax interpretations of cosmetic surgery, this line of 
authority shows persuasively that there is a growing consensus in the medical and legal 
communities that SRS is a genuine medical treatment despite its effects on physical 
appearance. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The medical expense deduction is important because it mitigates the burden of 
disease for taxpayers with a decreased ability to pay due to illness.  Critics maintain that 
the deduction is not supportable in practice, because it can allow deduction for expenses 
that arise from quasi-medical preferences that are unrelated to disease.  The exclusion of 
                                                      
222 See supra Part II. 
223 See Susan L. Megaard, Scope of the Medical Expense Deduction Clarified and Broadened by 
New Tax Court Decision, 112 J. TAX’N 353, 354 (2010) (citations omitted). 
224 See id. 
225 See supra notes 104-16 and accompanying text. 
226 See, e.g., O’Donnabhain, 134 T.C. at 62 (citing De’lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d 630, 634 (4th 
Cir. 2003); Allard v. Gomez, 9 Fed. Appx. 793, 794 (9th Cir. 2001); Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 106 
(2d Cir. 2000); Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967, 970 (10th Cir. 1995); Phillips v. Mich. Dept. of Corr., 932 
F.2d 969 (6th Cir. 1991), aff’g 731 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mich. 1990); White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 325-27 
(8th Cir. 1988); Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 411-413 (7th Cir. 1987)). 
227 See Pinneke v. Preisser, 623 F.2d 546 (8th Cir. 1980) (holding that SRS is not cosmetic surgery 
such that it can be denied by State Medicaid plan); J.D. v. Lackner, 145 Cal. Rptr. 570, 572 (Ct. App. 1978) 
(overturning decision that SRS was cosmetic and thus ineligible for Medicaid coverage).  But see Smith v. 
Rasmussen, 249 F.3d 755, 759-61 (8th Cir. 2001) (denying reimbursement for SRS under State Medicaid 
plan because of its cosmetic nature).  
112 COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW [Vol.3:86 
cosmetic surgery from the definition of medical care should be seen as an effort by 
Congress to further conform the medical expense deduction to its proper role.  Whether 
or not the medical expense deduction is a tax expenditure, its objective is appropriate 
government policy.  Because the policy itself is suitable, the deduction need not be 
interpreted narrowly.228  Given this understanding, it follows that expenses used to treat 
disease recommended by the taxpayer’s doctor and consistent with generally accepted 
medical practice cannot be disallowed as cosmetic surgery.  This conclusion is supported 
both by the policy justifications for the medical expense deduction as a whole, as well as 
the statutory language of § 213(d).  GID is a well-recognized disease, and SRS is 
regarded by many medical professionals as its most effective treatment in severe cases.  
Because GID is a disease, expenses incurred for its treatment are exactly the sort of 
burdensome expenses that the medical expense deduction is meant to alleviate.  Thus, it 
follows that a tax deduction for physician-recommended SRS is both appropriate and 
essential. 
                                                      
228 Courts often construe deductions narrowly, referencing the familiar maxim that “an income tax 
deduction is a matter of legislative grace and . . . the burden of clearly showing the right to the claimed 
deduction is on the taxpayer.”  Interstate Transit Lines v. Comm’r, 319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943).  The 
appropriateness of such a narrow construction is not undisputed.  See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & DEBORAH H. 
SCHENK, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 229 (6th ed. 2009) (“It is true that the 
taxpayer bears the burden of proving his right to a deduction, but the question should not be approached in 
terms of a ‘narrow’ construction or ‘legislative grace.’  The clear intent of Congress to impose the tax on 
‘taxable income’ requires recognition of deductions as well as gross income.  When Congress wants to limit 
deductions, it can do so explicitly.”).  However, this debate is well beyond the scope of this Note. 
